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MR. JUSTICE CARDOZO* 
William 0. Douglas 
I NEVER knew Cardozo intimately. I read most of his opinions and all of his books; and I heard him lecture. My personal 
association with him, however, was limited. When he came to 
Washington, D. C., he lived in rather lonely isolation. I visited 
with him occasionally in his apartment where we talked about 
trivial, as well as philosophical, things. He was a gentle-almost 
self-effacing-man. Yet he had a mind with as keen a cutting edge 
as any I ever knew. 
He was an indefatigable worker; and law was to him a demand-
ing mistress. In those days the Court heard arguments five days a 
week and had its Conferences on Saturday. Hughes, with an eye 
to the advanced age of some of the Brethren, worked hard to finish 
the Conference by 4:30 p.m. And before Hughes left the building 
that evening he would make the assignment of cases to the justices 
for opinion writing. By six o'clock the assignment lists would be 
on their way to the justices' homes by messengers-all except Car-
dozo' s. Hughes told me that he sent the list to Cardozo on Mon-
days. "Otherwise," said Hughes with a twinkle in his eyes, "Cardozo 
would spend Sunday working on an opinion, rather than resting or 
conversing with friends." 
Cardozo, like other judges, is a man who may be long remem-
bered or soon forgotten. This is too early a date to know for cer-
tain. The future uses those distillations from the past which fill 
its needs. And the needs of next century are wholly speculative. 
Even the needs of another year cannot be known. For needs de-
pend on the mood of people, on the causes that catch their imagi-
nation, on their spiritual as well as their physical cravings. 
I remember a discussion with Brandeis about the durability of 
the work of judges. Miller, appointed by Lincoln in 1862, served 
on the Court for twenty-eight years. He was an extraordinarily 
superior lawyer and towered high above many of his colleagues. 
Brandeis-an admirer of Miller-often talked with me about the 
• Paper delivered by Associate Justice William 0. Douglas of the United States Su-
preme Court on receiving the 1959 Benjamin N. Cardozo Award of the Tau Epsilon Rho 
Law Fraternity on December 30, 1959 at Chicago, Illinois. 
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man and could not understand how it was that Miller by the 1920's 
and 1930's had been mostly forgotten. 
A few noble phrases from the Magna Carta come winging 
down the corridors to inspire people whose problems are vastly 
different from those who lived under King John. Magna Carta 
became a symbol of man's struggle against tyranny and it has been 
translated anew to every generation to do service to changing prob-
lems and conditions. Ideas that may have been only germs of 
thought at the time they were uttered survive that age and serve 
new and different needs. The Bible, the Koran, the Bhagavad Gita 
are the prime examples of ancient manuscripts surviving each pe-
riod and becoming contemporary documents for every age. 
Cardozo was a stylist and his neatly turned phrases may well 
become part of our folklore. Cardozo was a craftsman supreme. 
Only those who cherish the art will fully appreciate his skill. The 
law, the lawyers, and the judges cling stubbornly to obsolete doc-
trine. The reason why a rule may once have had validity is for-
gotten. The rule is put to uses beyond the imagination of the feu-
dalistic judge who fashioned it. Cardozo was the artist who re-
shaped relics from the past, put new raiments on them, and, when 
reconditioned, made them do service in today's practical affairs. 
No one has described the craftsmanship of Cardozo better than the 
late Walton H. Hamilton in an article in the University of Chicago 
Law Review.1 Cardozo dealt with a law that lived-a law that re-
sponded to modern conditions. He made useful tools out of ancient 
stuff-useful in the sense that they were adaptable to the needs of 
an industrial society. 
Those who teach often speak of the knack Cardozo had of "tidy-
ing up" the law. He constantly broke new ground. Yet he did not 
leave the impression that he was doing an ad hoc job. His task was 
in part to do justice in the individual case. Yet he knew that rules 
cannot be turned and shaped merely to meet this exigency or that. 
A judge who follows that course makes law capricious-good for 
this day only. Cardozo worked in the great common law tradition 
and made each case the occasion to take new bearings, to alter the 
direction necessary for justice in the run of cases, and to leave 
guides as to the thrust and limitations of the rule as refashioned. 
Cardozo therefore was the delight of the teacher of law. 
1 Hamilton, "Cardozo the Craftsman,'' 6 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1938). 
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Apart from Holmes and Stone, I suppose Cardozo had roots 
deeper in the common law than any judge on the Supreme Court 
in modern times. But the Court has few problems in common law 
dimensions. Those that catch the public eye are the epoch-making 
constitutional decisions. But the main grist for the mill is the con-
struction of statutes in an ever-widening field of federal legislation. 
Legislative rules become encrusted with administrative rulings; 
and the judge must fill the interstices. There is administrative 
expertise~ so-called, to appraise; and the legislative policy to divine. 
Common law principles play very limited roles in resolving those 
issues. . 
Cardozo's opinions commence with 285 U.S. and end with 302 
U. S. These were the volumes produced in six years; and that 
period is hardly adequate for any man to make the full round of 
the federal field. Stone used to say that twelve years were needed, 
no matter what the appointee's background may have been. There 
is no prior experience that adequately prepares one for service on 
the Supreme Court. No state court, no lower federal court has the 
range and variety of problems that reach the Court which is at the 
apex of our dual judicial system. No law practice can possibly put 
one on speaking terms with the specialized problems coming from 
the numerous agencies of government nor with the large questions 
that involve constitutional rights. Stone's estimate of a dozen years 
is a fair one. Cardozo with all his eminence lacked the time to be-
come fully exposed to the multitudinous problems that arise in the 
federal domain and that implicate federal-state relations. Yet he 
served in the great tradition while on the Supreme Court. 
He was with the dissenters when the Agricultural Adjustment 
Act was held unconstitutional in United States v. Butler.2 He was 
with the dissenters when the Court struck down a New York mini-
mum wage law for women.3 He was alert to protest the Baron 
Parke technique of using rules of procedure as stumbling blocks 
or traps, especially where life or liberty was at stake. Herndon v. 
Georgia,4 shows him eloquent in his plea that the rights of man not 
be lost on the flypaper of procedure. 
The dissenting combination of Holmes, Brandeis and Stone was 
replaced by Brandeis, Stone and Cardozo. There was novelty for 
2 297 U.S. 1 (1936). 
s Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936). 
4 295 U.S. 441 at 446 (1935). 
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him in this role as dissenter. For Cardozo at Albany,5 like Marshall 
in Washington, D. C., had held his judicial group together, seldom 
dissenting. But his first opinion written on the Supreme Court was 
a dissent.6 And, during the 1934 Term and the 1935 Term when 
the so-called New Deal legislation was being levelled by decisions 
of the Court, Cardozo' s voice was often heard in protest. This is 
not the occasion to review that period of history. One thing can be 
said with assurance; and Walton Hamilton, in the article already 
referred to, said it exquisitely: "It is to Cardozo that credit is due 
for preserving the spark of sanity in a period of judicial panic. It 
is to his everlasting credit that during the darkest of days he met 
intolerance with tolerance."7 And when the tide turned and con-
stitutional doctrine, kept alive by dissent, was rediscovered and 
used to support the main pillars of this legislative program, Cardozo 
was on hand to cast his vote with the new majority. He indeed 
wrote for that majority in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,8 uphold-
ing the constitutionality of the Social Security Act. 
One who follows his work on the Court will not always agree 
with him. Cardozo was strangely silent when the "white primary" 
was approved in Grovey v. Townsend9-a decision that was over-
ruled nine years later by Smith v. Allwright.10 His treatment of a 
rate case11 leaves the impression that he gave accountants' entries 
far more prestige than they should enjoy. He was author of the 
Court's opinion in Palko v. Connecticut12 which made a narrow, 
limited application of the Bill of Rights to the states. There a state 
had obtained a conviction for murder; and a life sentence was im-
posed. The state appealed and obtained a reversal. A new trial 
was had and this time Palko was sentenced to death. He claimed 
error, alleging that his second trial was double jeopardy.13 The 
Fifth Amendment prohibits double jeopardy; and the question was 
whether that prohibition is applicable to the states by reason of the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court 
had long held that only some, not all, provisions of the Bill of 
5 For an estimate by his colleagues on the court of appeals, see 258 N.Y. at p. v (1932). 
6 Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434 at 448 (1932). 
7 Hamilton, "Cardozo the Craftsman," 6 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 1 at 18-19 (1938). 
8301 U.S. 548 (1937). 
o 295 U.S. 45 (1935). 
10 321 U.S. 649 (1944). 
11 West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 294 U.S. 63 (1935). 
12 302 U.S. l!l9 (1937). 
13 For the federal view, see Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957). 
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Rights were made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Cardozo accepted that construction and said that 
only those guarantees in the Bill of Rights that are "implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty"14 were carried over to the states by the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Double jeop-
ardy is not so included, ruled Cardozo, at least where the state is 
not trying to wear an accused out by a series of trials.15 And so 
Palko's second conviction was sustained. 
This problem of the application of the Bill of Rights to the 
states is a recurring one. There has never been a majority of the 
Court to say-all of those guarantees are included. Usually the Court 
has not been unanimous. Dissenters have almost always been on 
hand to claim that the Bill of Rights fixes the contours of due proc-
ess as that term is used in the Fourteenth Amendment. The first 
Harlan so contended in 1884.16 Mr. Justice Butler-not often iden-
tified with the libertarian school-dissented in the Palko case. And 
the split among the justices on this point has continued. 
The concept of due process which Cardozo approved in the 
Palko case has been carried so far as to permit both the state and the 
federal governments to prosecute for the same, identical acts.17 It 
has permitted one state to chop up activities into many small units, 
making separate crimes of each, though in essence but one unitary 
act is involved.18 Whether Cardozo could have swallowed these 
strong doses is, of course, not known. He had a mind that was 
always open to new light, to new ideas. He knew for example that 
"the present definition of insanity has little relation to the truths 
of mental life"19 and was eager for the legislature to release the 
judiciary from the duty of applying it. Perhaps he would in time 
have released himself from the narrow concept of due process 
which the Palko case reflects. Perhaps in time Cardozo would have 
been influenced by the powerful reasons enumerated in Adamson 
v. California,20 and in other recent dissenting opinions for m-
clusion of the Bill of Rights in the concept of due process. 
14 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 at 325 (1937). 
15 Id. at 328. 
16 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 at 538 (1884). And see Twining v. New Jersey, 
211 U.S. 79 at 114 (1908). 
17 Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959). 
18 Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958). Cf. Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958). 
19 "What Medicine Can Do for Law," address by Judge Cardozo, New York Academy 
of Medicine, Nov. 1, 1928, reprinted in SELECrED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO 
371 at 387, Hall ed. (1947). 
20 332 U.S. 46 at 68 (1947). 
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Those who talk of federalism often use the cliche that its prob-
lems cannot be resolved in terms of "justice." Yet due process is a 
concept which evolved in man's search for justice. Think of the 
advance in the scheme of "justice" ( or, if you like, in the scheme 
of "ordered liberty") which would be made if states were required 
to see that defendants got the aid of counsel, not only in capital 
cases,21 but in every instance where a major crime was charged.22 
The Bill of Rights sets standards much higher than those provided 
by some of the states. It is not too much to hope that its measure 
of due process will some day be made nation-wide. 
I have said enough to indicate that, great as I think Cardozo 
was, he worked in troublesome fields where men are far from 
unanimous and where, in the eyes of some, he occasionally went 
astray. Yet he lived and worked in the great tradition and would 
be the first to admit he was not infallible. 
He had character and fidelity to high work-standards. Above 
all he did not fear the mob or see ghosts or become impelled by 
fear. In Matter of Doyle~23 he wrote for the court of appeals in 
holding that an immunity statute, to be valid, must be as broad as 
the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination. He spoke 
of the public demand that criminals be caught and punished. Yet 
he added a word of caution and wrote this historic sentence: "A 
community whose judges would be willing to give it whatever law 
might gratify the impulse of the moment would find in the end 
that it had paid too high a price for relieving itself of the bother 
of awaiting a session of the Legislature and the enactment of a 
statute in accordance with established forms."24 
Cardozo was the embodiment of the idea of an independent 
judiciary. He knew the value of rocks over which great waves 
could break and expend themselves. He was always unmoved by 
the tempests and storms. He tried to make justice a vivid concept 
in his bailiwick whoever the defendant, whatever the issue. 
Cardozo's concept of an independent judiciary is a part of the 
western tradition that is today making powerful impacts on the 
legal systems of the East. The independent judiciary in India is a 
tower of strength in these troubled times. It, too, lives above the 
storms and tries to administer the laws impartially and dispas-
21 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
22 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 at 474 (1942). 
23 257 N.Y. 244, 177 N.E. 489 (1931). 
24 Id. at 268. 
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sionately. Other young nations are beginning to wonder if their 
greatest anchor against passion and prejudice may not be an inde-
pendent judiciary. The need at times for a second and more sober 
thought is great. The new constitution of France provides a 
tribunal to pass on issues of constitutionality. Turkey has one in 
modified form. In communist lands it is the party that has always 
put the gloss of orthodoxy on legislative acts. In Yugoslavia there 
is a new development. In a few months a law will go into effect 
providing courts-both at the state and federal level-with power 
tq determine issues of constitutionality. 
The role of courts-independent and supreme in their own 
domain-will be increasing as the new nations of the world emerge. 
Cardozo's admonition will be timely to them. It also carries an 
important reminder to all of us here in the United States. These 
newly-emerging nations have written constitutions for which our 
own Constitution often serves as a model. The opinions of their 
courts are filled with citations of our own decisions. What we 
as judges and lawyers do at home today thus often becomes in-
stantly important in many other nations. 
The major problems of the newly-emerging countries are not 
entirely economic. They start with the need to develop viable 
societies along democratic lines. This includes the maintenance 
of a system of checks and balances. It means restraints on the 
powers of majorities and the protection of minorities. It means 
an independent judiciary. Some countries are filled with racial 
and religious hatreds that are so powerful as to endanger any full-
fledged democratic development. Minorities experience daily 
discrimination. The idea of equal justice may have been powerful 
when the common enemy was a colonial empire that held all the 
people down. Yet when liberation comes, the majority often 
dilutes that concept of equal justice and turns the powers of govern-
ment to its own advantage. 
Moreover, young nations have not developed traditions and 
habits of thought that propel them along democratic lines. Even 
criticisms of a prime minister may loom as a monstrous offense; 
and freedom of speech and of press are made to suffer. In these 
and many other ways the rights of man are again put in jeopardy, 
once independence is acquired. The American example is, there-
fore, of continuing importance both at home and abroad. 
The maintenance of our strong traditions of civil rights for all 
our people, irrespective of race or wealth, religion or color, is the 
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most important task facing the legal profession. When we let the 
standard fall, we disappoint people everywhere. When excellence 
and courage in the Cardozo tradition are the measure of our deeds, 
the hearts of men the world over are lifted. 
